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ABSTRACT
Monetary authorities often seem reluctant to discuss the conduct of monetary
policy.  There is a concern that greater openness in monetary policy-making may
lead to volatility in financial markets, and specifically in interest rates.  However,
to date there is very little direct empirical evidence but recent changes in the
monetary policy framework of the UK provide an opportunity to gain some
insight on this issue.  First, we present a model of monetary policy showing that
volatility that would other wise occur to aggregate prices is transmitted to the rate
of interest in a tightly specified nominal regime.  Under some circumstances
information flows may add to volatility; if volatility is harmful then central
bankers may be right to be reticent.    However, the evidence suggests that even
though volatility has indeed risen in the recent past, there is no evidence that this
volatility is directly attributable to increased information flows per se.
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“Greater openness is not a popular case in central banking circles, where mystery is sometimes argued
to be essential to effective monetary policy…[but] a more open central bank, by contrast, naturally
conditions expectations by providing the markets with information about its own view of the
fundamental forces guiding monetary policy.”
Alan Blinder (1998)
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade and more, an important debate has been conducted
concerning the optimal degree of transparency and commitment in monetary policy-
making.  The discussion surrounding the development of explicit inflation targeting
(see e.g., Leiderman and Svensson (1995) or King (1997)) as a policy rule illustrates
this well. While there now seems to be widespread agreement on the need for a
degree of commitment in the conduct of policy, there is little consensus as to how
open the process of policymaking should be.  Indeed, there often seems to be little
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2agreement on what it means to be “transparent”.4  In any event, traditionally central
bankers have appeared reticent in making clear what they do and why.  More recently,
things have started to change.
In some, perhaps unlikely, quarters this natural reticence of central bankers
has been shed and replaced by something close to a reforming zeal.5  Inflation
targeting countries, in particular, seem to be in the process of redefining the agenda
for transparency and have influenced the IMF’s (1999) recently published Code of Good
Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies.  In this vein the recent
experience of the UK and the eleven founding members of EMU provide possibly
polar examples.  The former used the opportunity of monetary reform - following
ERM exit in 1992 and especially following the adoption of instrument independence
of the Bank of England in 1997 - to conduct a monetary experiment in inflation
targeting and openness à la mode.6  The latter has used a similar opportunity involving
an experiment in supra-national monetary commitment, leading up to the creation of
European Monetary Union on 1 January 1999, to adopt, by comparison, a relatively
secretive regime.
As we outline in more detail below, the arguments against “too much”
openness seem to be essentially two-fold.  The first argument, exposited primarily by
monetary policymakers, but which has received relatively little attention in the
academic literature, is that a consequence of greater information flows, for example
from forecast revisions or from published disagreements amongst policymakers, will
be a monetary policy regime characterised by high interest rate variability.  The
second argument, which has received more attention in the theoretical literature, is
that a degree of secrecy will give the authorities an informational advantage and
therefore greater likelihood of success in formulating (counter-cyclical)
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3Policy.7  Such views may indeed discernible in recent pronouncements by senior
officials of the European Central Bank to justify what many commentators view as an
undesirably secretive approach to policymaking. 8
In any case, the possible advantages of secrecy in playing the monetary
authorities’ hand continue to be the focus of ongoing macroeconomic research.9
However, relatively little empirical work has focussed on the first argument outlined
above and consequently that is the focus of this paper: What are the implications for
interest rate volatility of increasing the degree of transparency in the conduct of
monetary policy?
1.1 Some Related Literature
Central bankers appear to dislike interest rate volatility.  Froyen and Boyd
(1995) note arguments by both Alfred Hayes, former president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and Paul Volcker in favour of reducing interest rate variability.
There have also been a number of papers documenting and analysing so-called
‘interest rate smoothing’ (see e.g., Goodfriend, (1991), Goodhart (1996) and
Woodford (1999)).  Although the primary focus of that literature is the observed
tendency for the smoothing of policy rates, part of the motivation for such behaviour
has been to provide a stable environment for financial markets.  In a well-known
analysis of some of these issues, Goodfriend (1986, p78) noted that "the FOMC
values secrecy because it is thought to promote interest rate stability".10  And this
supposed role for secrecy in helping monetary authorities to stabilise interest rates
goes beyond the US.  The President of the European Central Bank, Wim Duisenberg,
has recently argued against publishing the minutes of the ECB’s governing council
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4(analogous to the FOMC) on the basis that it would lead to undesirable speculation
in the financial markets.11  The concern of the policymakers seems then to be that
financial markets may pick up false signals about the future course of monetary
policy. On the other hand, Buiter (1998) and Blinder (1998) turn this argument on its
head, arguing instead that publishing minutes (greater openness, more generally) is a
mechanism to guide markets to focus on the fundamental determinants of the course
of monetary policy.
To our knowledge, there have been no direct tests for a link between
transparency and interest rate volatility, but a few studies have been suggestive in this
regard.   For example, based on an analysis of FOMC voting minutes, Belden (1989)
argues that knowledge of the dissenting votes allows one to attribute to policy makers
possibly markedly differing preferences.12  One implication of this work is that the
markets may have difficulty interpreting any particular FOMC decision, in terms of
these preferences, resulting in financial market volatility.   In a similar vein, Friedman
and Schwartz (1963, p133-4) argue that dollar exchange rate variability was the price
paid for monetary policy uncertainty, over the continuing operation of the gold
standard, towards the end of the nineteenth century.13  Finally, Alesina and Summers
(1993) present cross-country evidence that higher central bank independence may be
associated with lower interest rate variability, suggesting that more credible regimes
enjoy less variable interest rates.  Of course, the key issue then is what is the
relationship between openness and credibility.
 It would seem, therefore, that the arguments for and against secrecy could go
either way.  If markets were uncertain about policy preferences then a priori it seems
plausible that increased transparency could reduce financial market volatility, as
financial market agents became better informed.  On the other hand, if markets trade
on every twist and turn in the policy debate, volatility may well rise (Blinder (1998)).14
In the following section we shall try to sharpen the testable implications of this
debate by providing some theoretical backdrop to the link between transparency and
volatility of interest rates.
 The rest of the paper is set out as follows.  Section 2 introduces a simple
model of interest rate volatility, building on the analyses of Svensson (1991) and
Gerlach (1994), and demonstrates that interest rate volatility may be a natural
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5consequence of a tightly focussed (in a sense we explain below) monetary policy.  The
model also implies some testable implications with respect to the level of
transparency and interest rate volatility.  In Section 3 we turn to the empirical
evidence and estimate the volatility of short-term UK interest rates.  Section 4
investigates whether the information flows associated with increased transparency
have been associated with higher interest rate volatility, as the model of Section 2
implies under some circumstances.  Briefly, we do find that interest rate volatility has
risen over this period, however, there is little indication, based on UK evidence, that
increased information flows are “disruptive”.  Section 5 summarises, concludes and
offers some thoughts on further work.
 
 
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF INTEREST RATE VARIABILITY UNDER INFLATION
TARGETING
Gerlach (1994) has observed that there is a close formal symmetry between
target zone models of the exchange rate and inflation targeting.   In this section we
build on this observation to examine the model’s implications for the volatility of
interest rates in a credible, inflation-targeting regime with narrow bands.  As we note
in the discussion at the end of this section, this model arguably captures some
important aspects of the most recent monetary policy regime in the UK.  Much of
the derivation is familiar from the literature on exchange rate target zones, stemming
from Krugman (1991), and so we go through it rather quickly.  More details are
contained in Appendix A.
2.1.   The Model
Equations (1) and (2) represent respectively the demand for money, and the
Fisher equation for the nominal interest rate.  All variables are in natural logarithms
(except the interest rate):
uiypm +-=- ba (1)
dtdpEri /)(+= (2)
6Where m is the nominal stock of money, p is the price level, y is real output, i is
the nominal interest rate, u is an i.i.d. mean zero disturbance, with bounded support, r
is the real rate of interest and E is the expectations operator.  (1) and (2) can be
solved for the price-level,
dtdpEfp /)(b+= (3)
Where urymf -+-º ba .
Equation (3) shows that the price level ‘today’ is a function of fundamentals
( f ), and expectations about future changes in the price level.  Following Gerlach
(1994) we de-trend the price level in the following way:
dtdcEdtdcdpEcfcp /)(/)( bb +-+-=-
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That is, the fundamentals (4) follow the continuous time version of a random
walk.  The closed-form solution for the, the price-level is given by the following
expression (see the Appendix A for details).
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+
-
+= -
-
-
rsrs
frfr
ee
ee
rffp
__
1
___
)( (6)
In what follows we drop the overbars for notational convenience.  -r and r
represent the roots of the familiar second-order differential equation (equation A
Appendix A), and (-s, s) is the interval in which the fundamentals take values.  The
similarity between this expression and the expression in Krugman (1991) for the
target zone exchange rate is clear.  Both imply that when their respective
fundamentals follow a Brownian motion, in the presence of well-defined and credible
7reflecting barriers, the price-level/exchange rate will have the familiar S-shaped
pattern.15
As in the case of a target zone exchange rate16, the asymptotic distribution for
the price-level will be bi-modal, since towards the barriers the price-level will become
less responsive to the fundamentals as the expectation term in (8) plays an increasing
role.  In other words, more intuitively, once the price-level wanders near to the
barriers, it tends to spend a long time there.
Both the conditional and unconditional distribution of interest rates can now
be easily derived in the current set up (see Appendix A).  The nominal interest rate
can then be written as (using (2) and (3) and (B) in the Appendix A):
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For the case of zero drift and symmetric band the nominal interest rate is
given by (8)17:
[ ]rsrs
frfr
ee
ee
ri -
-
+
-
-=
bl
__
(8)
This model has precise implications for the conditional or instantaneous
distribution of interest rates, which we denote )( fis .  The product of the partial
derivative of the interest rate with respect to the fundamentals, and the standard
deviation of the fundamentals gives this18, that is:
ff
i if ss -=)(
Using (7) above, and our expression for the price-level, we can re-write this as
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In other words, the instantaneous standard deviation of interest rates is a
function of the difference between the standard deviation of the fundamentals and
the variability of the price-level; there is a trade-off between price-level variability and
interest rate variability.  And importantly, for the case where the fundamentals band is
“narrow”, the interest rate’s instantaneous standard deviation is “large”.  That is,
when the band is narrow the price-level will be relatively unresponsive to changes in
the fundamentals (intuitively, it is close to the bands and so expectational forces are
increasing in importance), and as we noted above there is a negative association
between price-level and interest rate variability.  In fact, it is apparent from (9) that as
the standard deviation of the price-level approaches zero, the instantaneous standard
deviation of the interest rate increases and reaches a finite limit.20  On the other hand,
interest rate variability is low for a large band mirroring the fact that the
responsiveness of the price level to the fundamentals is relatively large, except
towards the edge of the band when, for the reasons just mentioned, variability rises
sharply.
This model may capture some aspects of recent UK experience.  When the
Bank of England was made independent in 1997 long term interest rates, specifically
inflation expectations, fell suggesting that credibility had risen.  Indeed since then
inflation expectations, extracted from the nominal and real yield curves, have
remained close to the target inflation rate of 2½%.  Similarly, the symmetry of the
target zone bears close resemblance to the UK regime. The mapping is not one-one,
however.  There is no presumption that the %1±  band is a reflecting barrier, in the
strict sense (Harrison, 1985).  Nevertheless, since May 1997 actual inflation (and a
fortiori, inflation expectations) have respected this band.
The model also suggests potential links between information flows (from the
monetary policy authorities to the financial markets) and interest rate volatility.  If
information flows are indeed informative about the evolution of fundamentals then
the model implies that these should have explanatory power with respect to interest
rate volatility.  However, this need not be the only role such information flows play,
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deviation is the final term in this expression.
19   We have normalised the real interest rate to zero in deriving (9).
20   For the target zone exchange rate model Svensson (1991) derives an analogous result.
9as they may also provide information on the nature of the reflecting barriers (more
generally, policy preferences).  In the case of a narrow band regime, which we are
arguing is reminiscent of recent monetary reforms in the UK, a relatively high degree
of interest rate volatility would be observed regardless of the level of openness.  If
volatility in nominal interest rates is costly, and we do not in this paper need to take a
view on this issue, then it is important for policymakers to distinguish between these
two channels.  One implies that a degree of secrecy may indeed be beneficial, while
the other implies that having ‘indistinct’, or perhaps wide, reflecting barriers may be
more appropriate.  In our empirical section, therefore, we shall investigate closely
how information flows and interest rate volatility are related.  Before doing this,
however, we establish the key characteristics in the behaviour of interest rate volatility
across the recent past.
3.     THE BEHAVIOUR OF THREE-MONTH STERLING LIBOR
 
 In order to understand the impact of the choice of the nominal regime on the
behaviour of short-term rates, in particular the instantaneous standard deviation, we
outline the behaviour of three-month Sterling LIBOR since 1987.
 
3.1 The Regimes
 
 We identify and examine five nominal regimes:
1. DM-shadow:  23/3/87 – 29/2/88;
2. Pre-ERM:  3/5/88 – 5/10/90;
3. ERM:  19/11/90 – 27/8/92;
4. Inflation Target I:  9/10/92 – 12/3/97;
5. Inflation Target II – 23/5/97 – 31/5/99.
 Our identification of the last three nominal regimes is relatively
uncontroversial.  The ERM period involved membership of a target zone system of
‘fixed’ exchange rates.  Inflation Target I constituted the period of inflation targeting
without operational independence for the Bank of England, and Inflation Target II
represents the period following the adoption of operational independence for the
10
Bank of England.  Regimes 1 and 2 require some justification.21  The difference
between the first two regimes is possibly subtle, but one that we suspect may be
significant.  The DM-shadow period was a somewhat muddled period in UK
monetary policy.  The UK government was ostensibly targeting money supply
growth.  However, it increasingly became clear that, in practice, policymakers were
focussing heavily on the exchange (See Lawson (1992)).  The pre-ERM period saw
the authorities explicitly commit to joining the ERM “when the time was right”. 22
 
 Table 1 – Interest Rate Moments Across Recent UK Regimes
  DM-
Shadow
 Pre-ERM  ERM  IT-I  IT-II
 Maximum a  0.426  0.515  0.283  0.294  0.204
 Minimum  -0.542  -0.328  -0.339  -0.403  -0.175
 Mean  -0.001  0.009  -0.006  -0.002  0.002
 Standard
Deviation
 0.099  0.083  0.069  0.055  0.040
 Skewness b  0.021  1.868  -0.154  -0.747  0.485
 Kurtosis c  6.266  8.998  2.683  7.698  4.820
 Notes:  All numbers are calculated from log differences in the three-month LIBOR interest
rate.  a) the first three rows are given in percentage points i.e. so the maximum change in the DM-
shadow period was 43 bp; b) the skewness is calculated such that a positive (negative) number
indicates right (left) skewness and c) a positive (negative) number for kurtosis indicates fatter
(thinner) than normal tails (i.e. we have subtracted 3 from the measured kurtosis).  Appendix B plots
the innovations in the series and its distribution.
 
 Table 1 shows that the character of the interest rate distributions would seem
to be strongly influenced by regime choice (and justifies our distinguishing between
regimes 1 and 2).  There is little evidence of unconditional normality in the interest
rate process across these five regimes.  Significant skewness is only absent in the
period of DM-shadowing and the ERM.  In all cases we find significant kurtosis in
the interest rate innovations and this suggests that the variance of the interest rate
innovations may display serial dependence.  The crude unconditional measures of
                                         
21   In identifying the first three regimes we follow Pesaran and Robinson (1993).  We also follow
their advice in selecting truncated sub-samples from the operational period of each regime.  We
measure innovations as the log difference of the end of day closing price average of bid-ask spreads.
The data is available on request from the authors.
22   Regimes 1 and 2 both involved indeterminate exchange rates, however.  This is because the
regimes involved commitments to commit. With no final date of pegging given, any initial exchange
rate level can be consistent with any final peg because the authorities must ratify any expectations of
future money supply.
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variance suggest some reduction in the volatility of interest rate innovations through
time.  But we will return to the question of interest rate volatility once we have
accounted for its time variance.
 
 
 3.2 Measuring Interest Rate Volatility
 
 Time-varying volatility affects the higher moments of the unconditional
distribution of interest rate innovations.  Table 1 reports that significantly greater
kurtosis is found for the interest rate innovations than a normally distributed random
variable and is consistent with the possibility of time-varying volatility.  We model the
log change, or returns, in three-month Sterling LIBOR following Harvey et al (1994).
We employ the Kalman filter to estimate the parameters driving stochastic volatility
and hence estimate the level of volatility, ht, at each time t.
 
 ( ),2exp ttttt hr sees == ( ),1,0~IIDte Tt ,,1K= (10)
 
 Where,
 
 ,1 ttt hh hf +=+ ( )2,0~ hsh NIDt (11)
 
 The returns process has serial dependence in its variance.  We use a quasi-
maximum likelihood method (QML) to estimate the state space form of (11) and the
squared and logged process for (10) using the Kalman filter giving us recursive
estimates of the variance component, ht.23  Given the non-normality of the returns
process the QML estimator offers an obvious attraction.
 Table 2 presents the estimation results and suggests that the time-varying
volatility models pass the relevant statistical tests.  The volatility process is found to
have significant persistence in each regime.  The conditional estimate of the error
driving the volatility process shows clearly that this has been highest in the second
inflation-targeting regime, at 2.011.  In terms of a simple intuition relating interest
rate and policy uncertainty to macroeconomic instability these findings offers
something of a puzzle.  In fact, interest rate volatility would seem to have been lowest
in the two pre-ERM regimes - which coincided with the late 1980s boom in the UK
                                         
23   These recursive estimates encompass a wide class of GARCH modelling procedures, see Harvey
et al (1994).
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economy.24  It would appear that neither the period of exchange rate targeting in the
ERM, which has also been associated with macroeconomic instability, nor the first
period of inflation targeting, which was not, offers an obvious pattern to the
estimated levels of interest rate volatility.
 
 Table 2:  Estimation Results for Interest Rate Volatility
Dm-
Shadow
Pre-
ERM
ERM IT I IT II
AR(1) Disturbance
Term Standard
Error
0.513 0.179 0.774 0.557 2.011
AR(1) f 0.818 0.989 0.550 0.794 0.486
Standard Error 2.044 1.738 2.153 2.441 2.316
Log-Likelihood -177.159 -350.86 -357.663 -717.458 -442.827
Normality 8.720 15.99 36.65 84.15 32.78
Heteroscedasticity 1.405 0.415 1.266 0.793 1.209
Serial Correlation
(1)
-0.022 0.090 -0.012 0.018 0.0053
(20)
-0.083 -0.012 -0.014 0.025 -0.045
DW 2.035 1.805 2.006 1.961 1.968
R2 0.035 0.205 0.011 0.021 0.051
Note:  The standard deviations of the heteroscedastic error process for each regime is given in the
first row.  The next row gives the estimated persistence parameter of the volatility process.  The
remaining statistics refer to the final regression.  The standard error is the square root of the
prediction error variance, normality is tested by the Bowman-Shenton statistic distributed as c2 under
the null, heteroscedasticity is an F-test, residual autocorrelation is given at t lags and DW is the
Durbin-Watson statistic.  The model is estimated recursively.
 
 However, we do find that the highest level of interest rate volatility has been
associated with the period of inflation targeting following the adoption of central
bank independence and a significant increase in the level of transparency.  This is
what the model in Section 2 would have predicted for this period although we need
to investigate how much of this volatility can be attributed to the information flows
per se, e.g., the revelation of disagreements over monetary policy, the release of the
                                         
24   Pesaran and Robinson (1993) discuss reasons why the lack of credibility in an exchange rate
regime may lead to low interest rate volatility.  We corroborate these earlier results in finding low
(instantaneous) volatility in these earlier regimes.
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Inflation Report, and so on.  Recall our earlier discussion.  We argued that if we find
a significant effect of ‘information flows’ onto volatility, then this would be evidence
that these provide information on the evolution of fundamentals.  If no such
influence is found, then we would be more likely to conclude that information flows
are revealing information about target bands.  If nominal interest rate variability is
costly, then it is important for the design of the nominal framework to distinguish
between these two cases.  We now turn to the key information flows in the IT2
regime.
 
 
 4. ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSPARENCY ON INTEREST RATE
VOLATILITY
 
4.1 Ditching ‘Monetary Mystique’
Over the last decade or so, as detailed above, the UK has adopted a number
of distinct nominal regimes.   This sequence has culminated, over the most recent
past (from May 1997), in an inflation targeting regime conducted by an instrument
independent central bank (in the sense of Fischer 1994, p292), and a policy process
which is amongst the most transparent anywhere (see Footnote 3).  Monetary policy
during this period has been transparent in the following sense:  (i) The final objective
of monetary policy has been made explicit and passed to an independent central
bank: (ii) The date of the MPC meetings are known around a year in advance:  (iii) the
decision is announced at a set time, often with an explanation for the decision;  (iv)
minutes detailing voting patterns are published;  and (v) regular quarterly forecasts of
the intermediate variable under a variety of assumptions are published.  In particular,
it makes known the voting record of the nine members of the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), along with a detailed summary/commentary of the MPC’s
deliberations.25  As we suggested earlier (Footnote 2), it is difficult to exaggerate the
size of this shift in UK monetary arrangements; it is the magnitude of this shift that
us with an opportunity to examine the relationship between policy disagreements,
openness, information flows and interest rate volatility.
4.2 A Brief History of Agreement and Disagreement within the MPC
                                         
25   This summary is not a transcript so that particular arguments advanced by members are non-
attributable.
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 How divided has the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee been
since its first meeting on 6-7 June 1997?  The Table in Appendix C outlines the
course of disagreements, on the basis of the published minutes, at the MPC since
formulation.26  We find that in 11 of the 23 meetings in our sample there has been
sufficient dissent to generate votes being cast against the final decision.27  This
unweighted average of dissenting meetings is perhaps a little misleading, as there have
been only 23 dissenting votes cast compared with 159 majority votes.  It could be
argued that much of the observed division could be put down to two factors.  First,
the nine months from January 1998 to September 1998 were responsible for 8 of the
10 dissenting meetings.  Second, either or both of two particular MPC members have
always been part of the dissenting minority.  Notwithstanding these factors, division
seems to be an accepted part of the MPC's public face.
 
 4.3 Minutes and Volatility
 
 Figure 1 plots the measure of time varying interest rate volatility from the
inception of central bank independence to end-1998.  The day to day process exhibits
considerable spikes in volatility.  We also plot on this chart the dates of the MPC
meetings and the date on which minutes were published.28  At first glance the data
appear to indicate some correspondence between monetary “news” and measured
volatility.  For instance, between October and December 1997 the release of the
previous month’s minutes of the MPC meeting seems to result in a considerable spike
in volatility even though there was no split votes at these meetings.  We turn now to a
closer examination of this relationship.  We ran a set of basic regressions of the
following form:
 ,,1 ttitt Dhh hf ++= - (12)
 
                                         
26   Source:  Bank of England (1997-9), Monetary Policy Committee Minutes, various.
27   These 9 months encompassed a turning point in the official interest rate.  Of course, a turning
point in the instrument variable need not (and perhaps should not) imply a turning point in the target
variable.
28   From the first meeting of the MPC on 5-6 June 1997, from which minutes were published on 16
July, until the meeting on 9-10 September 1998 minutes were published some days after the
following meeting.  This awkward practice was stopped after the October 1998 meeting from which
time minutes have been published on the second Wednesday following the announcement of the
MPC's decision.
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Initially we added three dummies to this basic AR process to capture:  (i) the
effects of announcements on the interest rate decision of the MPC;  (ii) the
publications of the minutes of the MPC meetings (including the record of voting
patterns);  (iii) and the publication of the (Quarterly) Inflation Report.29  In fact, there
appears to be little regular association between these information flows and LIBOR
volatility.   Table 3 shows that the inputting of these dummies appears to add little to
the fitted volatility process.  When entered individually, the top panel shows that
none of the dummies add significant information to the volatility process.30  The
dummies fail to be accepted into the fitted volatility process on the basis of the
standard variable deletion tests.  The first column in the lower panel shows the results
of a joint variable deletion test for all three dummies and the second column for the
dates of Inflation Reports alone.
 FIGURE 1
                                         
29   The Inflation Report, inter alia, presents the Bank of England's inflation forecast and an
assessment of the likely risks to that forecast.  We also split the sample of meetings' minutes
according to whether the votes cast at the meeting indicated dissent - this changes little.
30   We also try the possible combinations of dummies and find no significant information - results
available on request.
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It is possible that the day of the monetary policy decision or release of the
minutes provided few surprises for the markets, or perhaps the market reacted slowly
to the new information.   To examine whether or not such effects were present, we
added additional dummies one day either side of the announcements.   However, the
effects of announcements and minutes remain insignificant in accounting for
volatility.
 Table 3. The Impact of Transparency on Interest Rate Volatility I
  Announcements  Minutes  Inflation Report
 Coefficient  0.281  0.392  0.628
 T-ratio (p-value)  0.809 (0.385)  1.163 (0.246)  1.103 (.271)
 LM Statistic  2.143 (0.342)  1.238 (0.266)
 LR Statistic  2.15 (0.341)  1.204 (0.265)
 Joint Variable Deletion
Test
 F Statistic  1.053 (0.350)  1.217 (0.271)
 Notes:  The regression fitted the volatility process with an AR process with lags selected by
information criteria to 5.  The dummies were not found to be significantly different from zero.  The
Lagrange Multiplier and Likelihood Ratio Statistic are distributed as 2c and the F statistic as
F(2,433).
On this evidence, there would seem to be little to support the view that
increased information flows have directly increased the volatility of short-term
interest rates, and hence are informative about “fundamentals”.   We also investigated
whether or not volatility rose for a longer period ahead of the various information
flows.  To test for this we introduced another dummy which took the value of one in
the five working days leading up to an announcement.  We tried all feasible
permutations of these dummies (i.e., one-day and the five-day prior dummies.  We
present our results in tables 4A-4H, below.
The only significant variables appear to be ‘announcements’ (just significant at
the 10% level), and its subset, ‘interest rate changes’ (significant at the 5% level), both
identified using our one-day dummy.  Neither variable was identified as significant on
the basis of the longer dummy.  Interestingly, this is in contrast to our earlier results
(Table 3).  The relative levels of significance of “announcements”, and “interest rate
changes” indicate that it is the interest rate changes that are of overriding importance.
Neither the release of the minutes nor the Inflation Report appear to be significant,
which may be rather surprising, but is consistent with the results in Table 3.  It
appears that knowing that policymakers disagree over the appropriate level of interest
rates does not ‘unsettle the markets’.  And since interest rate changes are, in a sense,
17
unavoidable any increase in volatility that accompanies them is similarly unavoidable;
such effects may be present no matter what the information flows.
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Table 4 The Impact of Transparency on Interest Rate Volatility II
 PANEL A.
 One-day dummy  Announcements  Minutes
 Coefficient  0.59  0.03
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.61 (0.11)  0.01 (0.937)
 PANEL B.
 Five-day dummy  Announcements  Minutes
 Coefficient  -0.01  0.03
 T-ratio (p-value)  -0.1 (0.94)  0.15 (0.88)
 PANEL C.
 One-day dummy  Announcements  Inflation Report
 Coefficient  0.60  0.45
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.63 (0.10)  0.71 (0.48)
 PANEL D.
 Five-day dummy  Announcements  Inflation Report
 Coefficient  -0.02  -0.17
 T-ratio (p-value)  -0.1 (0.91)  -0.67 (0.50)
 PANEL E.
 One-day dummy  Change in Rates  Minutes
 Coefficient  1.1  0.03
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.97 (0.05)  0.07 (0.94)
 PANEL F.
 Five-day dummy  Change in Rates  Minutes
 Coefficient  0.27  0.05
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.23(0.22)  0.29 (0.77)
 PANEL G.
 One-day dummy  Change in Rates  Inflation Report
 Coefficient  1.1  0.44
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.98 (0.05)  0.70 (0.48)
 PANEL H.
 Five-day dummy  Change in Rates  Inflation Report
 Coefficient  0.26  -0.16
 T-ratio (p-value)  1.18(0.24)  -0.62 (0.54)
Notes:  The regression fitted the volatility process with an AR process with lags selected by
information criteria to 5.
As we noted at the beginning of the paper, it is possible that our information
flow measures (particularly minutes and announcements) are misleading; perhaps the
markets view them as “sanitised” and bereft of much new information, or perhaps
policymakers just do not have much of an information advantage over market
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participants.31  However, if policymakers do have an advantage it probably pertains to
“tactics”.  For instance, policymakers may decide to push policy rates incrementally to
their target level.  It is unlikely that such information would be recorded explicitly in
official minutes, and so market players would have to deduce the policymakers plans
by observing their actions.   That being the case, new information concerning
fundamentals may well be transmitted through interest rate changes (particularly if
interest rates are changing direction). In any case the more interesting question is
whether or not the more open regime of recent years has been associated with more
or less volatility.
 Table 5a. The Impact of Interest Rate Changes on Volatility (One-day
dummy)
  DM-
Shadow
 Pre-ERM  ERM  IT1  IT2
 Coefficient  0.31  0.02  0.25  0.28  1.1
 T-ratio
 (p-value)
 4.28
 (.00)
 1.32
 (0.19)
 2.31
 (0.02)
 1.16
 (0.25)
 1.97
 (0.05)
 Table 5b.      The Impact of Interest Rate Changes on Volatility (five-day
dummy)
  DM-
Shadow
 Pre-ERM  ERM  IT1  IT2
 Coefficient  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.21  0.27
 T-ratio
 (p-value)
 2.48
 (.014)
 2.94
 (0.003)
 1.12
 (0.26)
 2.21
 (0.027)
 1.21
 (0.23)
 Notes:  The regression fitted the volatility process with an AR process with 3 lags.  Dummy variables
were added taking a value of 1 on the 5 days ahead of an interest rate change and zero otherwise.
The coefficient reported in the table, is the coefficient on this dummy.
 
We now take a closer look at how volatility has responded in the period
running up to and the day of policy rate changes across regimes.  The results are
given in table 5a and 5b.  The one-day dummy identifies a significant effect except in
the ERM and the IT1 regimes, with the effect being particularly strong in the IT2
period.  In contrast, the five-day dummy is highly significant except in the IT2 regime
and (again) in the ERM period, where its p-value is over 20%.  We note in passing
                                         
31   There is clearly something in this; central banks are famously subtle, or perhaps obscure, in the
language they use.  Nevertheless, it would be highly misleading to dismiss all information flows as
uninformative.  For example, publishing voting records is surely information of sorts.
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that in the earlier regimes causality may be an issue, since it is plausible that the
volatility in part caused the interest rate change.  We did not investigate this further.
Overall, these results indicate that the IT2 regime has been associated with a
notable increase in volatility on the day of decisions but interestingly a reduction in
interest rate volatility ahead of policy decisions.
4.4 Discussion of the Results
On one level, it seems that information flows in the form of minutes of policy
meetings, published inflation forecasts, and announcements of no change in the
policy rate, show little sign of affecting, jointly or individually, the volatility of short-
term nominal interest rates.  The concern of central bankers that increased
transparency would have such an affect, based on this evidence, appears ill founded.
In fact, if anything, our results (specifically, Table 5B) indicate that the more open
regime in the UK has been associated with less volatile interest rates (ahead of a
change in interest rates), in marked contrast  to IT1, even though both regimes share
a number of operating characteristics.32
How do these results help us to account for the increase in volatility of
interest rates?  We tend to view the results as confirming the view sometimes
expressed that in practice central banks have little informational advantage over
financial markets.  By the time monetary policymakers publish their regular reports,
minutes, and so on the markets have themselves processed this information.  As a
consequence, and in the context of a credible nominal target, there are few surprises
in the published material.  To put the same point slightly differently, we think our
results are simply picking up the fact that markets are continually adapting to new
information.  And as the model of Section 2 suggested, in a tightly specified nominal
regime this is perfectly consistent with a relatively high degree of interest rate
volatility, as shocks to the fundamentals that would otherwise show up in prices are
transmitted to movements in interest rates.33
We note that our results have to remain somewhat tentative not least because
the IT2 regime is still in operation in the UK.  But, with this caveat in mind, what
might these results imply for the design of a nominal framework for monetary policy,
                                         
32   For instance in IT1 the advice given by the governor of the Bank of England to the Chancellor
on the appropriate level of interest rates was published, as were forecasts of inflation.  Nevertheless,
most commentators agree that IT2 is much more open than its predecessor, and of course the Bank
of England is now independent of government in the setting of interest rates.
33   This point shows in the high elasticity of volatility with respect to interest rate innovations.
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perhaps one that aimed to some extent to stabilise interest rates?  We think our
results have two implications.  First, detailed information releases in and of
themselves may do little to increase the volatility of interest rates; if anything, they
may even serve to reduce it.  Second, some fuzziness, or widening of the ‘reflecting
barriers’ may serve to reduce volatility.  However, since in practice no regime as far as
we are aware operates with the strict reflecting barriers (often used for reasons of
tractability) in stochastic control theory, it may be that policymakers have de facto
taken this point on board.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has sought to make three separate points.  First, the inception of
transparent monetary policy-making in the UK, since May 1997, has coincided with a
rise in the level of day-to-day interest rate volatility, as some policymakers might have
feared.  Second, this volatility may be an unavoidable side effect of a credible nominal
regime.  We showed that in such a case interest rate volatility acts to absorb volatility
that otherwise be transmitted to changes in the aggregate price level.  Third,
information flows associated with IT2 had little or no effect on interest rate volatility;
secrecy does not appear to help stabilise interest rates.
We think future work might usefully focus on two things.  First, it would be
interesting to observe in practice, across different countries, the relationship between
the degree of transparency and the volatility of interest rates, although measurement
issues are likely to loom large in such a study.  Second, as we noted above, there is
little agreement about what actually constitutes “information”.  The remark by Issing
(1999) which we quoted on page 6 makes this clear.  It would therefore be interesting
to know what central banks actually believe they are doing when they formulate and
disseminate their public statements.
22
REFERENCES
BANK OF ENGLAND (1997-9), Monetary Policy Committee Minutes, various.
BLINDER, A (1998) Central Banking in Theory and Practice, Cambridge:  MIT Press.
BOMBERGER, W A (1996) "Disagreement as a Measure of Uncertainty", Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 28, pp381-392.
BUITER, W H (1999) "Alice in Euroland", Speech to the South Bank University,
London on 15 December 1998, forthcoming in the Journal of Common Market Studies.
CUKIERMAN, A and MELTZER, A (1986), “A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility
and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information”, Econometrica, vol. 54,
1099-28.
DIXIT, A K (1992) "A Simplified Treatment of the Theory of Optimal Control of
Brownian Motion", Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 15, pp657-73.
DUISENBERG, W (1998), Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 29 June.
DUISENBERG, W (1999), The Role of the Central Bank in Europe, Speech at the
National Bank of Poland, May.
FAUST, J and SVENSSON, L (1999) “The Optimal Degree of Transparency”
NBER Working Paper No.
FISCHER, S (1994) “Modern Central Banking”, pp262-308 in CAPIE, F,
GOODHART, C A E, FISCHER, S and SCHNADT, N, The Future of Central
Banking, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.
FRIEDMAN, M and SCHWARTZ, A J (1963) A Monetary History of the United States,
1867-1969, Princeton:  Princeton University Press.
FROOT, K A and OSTFELD, O (1991) “Exchange Rate Dynamics Under
Stochastic Regime Shifts:  A Unified Approach”, Journal of International Economics, 31,
pp203-229.
23
GERLACH, S (1994) "On the Symmetry Between Inflation and Exchange Rate
Targets", Economics Letters, 44, pp133-137.
GOODFRIEND, M (1986) "Monetary Mystique:  Secrecy and Central Banking",
Journal of Monetary Economics, 17, pp63-92.
GOODFRIEND, M (1991) “Interest Rate Smoothing in the Conduct of Monetary
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Spring 1991, 7-30.
GOODHART, C A E (1996) “Why Do the Monetary Authorities Smooth Interest
Rates?” Working Paper, 81, LSE Financial Markets Group.
IMF (1999) Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies at
http://www.imf.org/.
HARRISON, M (1985) Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems, New York:  John
Wiley.
HARVEY, A, RUIZ, E and SHEPHARD, N (1994) "Multivariate Stochastic
Variance Models", Review of Economic Studies, 61, pp247-264.
ISSING, O (1998a) Financial Times 21 September.
ISSING, O (1998b) The European Central Bank at the eve of EMU Speech delivered
to the LSE European Society London School of Economics on 26 November 1998
in London.
ISSING, O (1999) “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable, or Willem in
Euroland, CEPR Policy Paper No.2.
KING, M (1997) “Changes in UK Monetary Policy:  Rules and Discretion in
Practice”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, pp81-97.
KRUGMAN, P (1991) "Target Zones and Exchange Rate Dynamics", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 106, pp669-82.
24
LAWSON, N (1992) The View From No. 11, Bantam Press.
LEIDERMAN, L. and SVENSSON, L E O (1995) Inflation Targets, CEPR, London.
MUSCATELLI, A (1998) “Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with
Uncertain Central Bank Preferences”, Economic Journal, 108, pp529-542.
PESARAN, B and ROBINSON, G (1993) "The European Exchange Rate
Mechanism and the Volatility of the Sterling-Deutschemark Exchange Rate", Economic
Journal, 103, pp1418-1431.
SVENSSON, L E O (1991) "Target Zones and Interest Rate Variability", Journal of
International Economics, 31, pp27-54.
WOODFORD, M (1999) “Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia”, NBER Working Paper
No 7261.
25
APPENDIX A
Using Ito’s lemma, we can express the price level (5) in the following way:
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The fundamentals process is assumed to take values in the open interval (-s, s).  We
may write the general solution to (A) in the following familiar way:
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A and B are definitized in the usual way by value-matching conditions,
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Svensson (1991) has analysed the distribution of interest rates within the context of
target zone models, and we follow fairly closely his general approach.  We use the fact
that for )(XfY = , if we know the distribution of X, then, under certain conditions,
we can write the density function for Y as ((() 11 yfyf
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where we have used that  
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dxdx
dy 1
= .
The numerator is derived in Harrison (1985) and represents the unconditional
distribution of a regulated Brownian motion with zero drift.
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The unconditional distribution of interest rates is then given by
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APPENDIX B:  MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE: VOTES AND DECISIONS
Date Eddie
George
David
Clementi
Mervyn
King
Ian
Plenderleith
Charles
Goodhart
DeAnne
Julius
Sir Alan
Budd
Willem
Buiter
John
Vickers
Decision
6/97 Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike N/A Hike N/A 7-0 HIKE 25BP
7/97 Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike N/A Hike N/A 7-0 HIKE 25BP
8/97 Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike N/A Hike N/A 7-0 HIKE 25BP
9/97 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold N/A Hold N/A 7-0 HOLD
10/97 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold N/A Hold N/A 7-0 HOLD
11/97 Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike N/A Hike N/A 7-0 HIKE 25BP
12/97 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold N/A 8-0 HOLD
1/98 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hike Hold Hike Hike N/A 5-3 HOLD
2/98 Hold Hold Hike Hold Hike Hold Hike Hike N/A 4-4* HOLD 7.25%
3/98 Hold Hold Hike Hold Hike Hold Hike Hike N/A 4-4* HOLD 7.25%
4/98 Hold Hold Hike Hold Hold Hold Hike Hike N/A 5-3 HOLD 7.25%
5/98 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Cut Hold Hike N/A 6-2 HOLD 7.25%
6/98 Hike Hike Hike Hike Hike Cut Hike Hike Hike 8-1 HIKE 25BP 7.50%
7/98 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold 9-0 HOLD 7.50%
8/98 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Cut Hold Hike Hold 7-2 HOLD 7.50%
9/98 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Cut Hold Hike Hold 7-2 HOLD 7.50%
10/98 Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut 9-0 CUT 25BP 7.25%
11/98 Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut75bp Cut 9-0 CUT 50BP 6.75%
12/98 Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut75bp Cut 9-0 CUT 50BP 6.25%
1/99 Cut Cut Cut Hold Cut Cut50bp Cut Cut Cut 8-1 CUT 25BP 6.00%
2/99 Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut Cut75bp Cut 9-0 CUT 50BP 5.50%
3/99 Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Hold Cut40bp Hold 8-1 HOLD 5.50%
4/99 11/22 CUT 25BP 5.25%
Against
Majority
0/22 0/22 3/22 1/22 3/22 5/22 4/15 8/22 0/10 10/22
Notes:  Governor exercises casting vote; and bold typeface indicates vote against majority decision
